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Directorate of Intelligence

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Terrorism R	eview
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13 January 1986

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DI TR 86-001 13 January 1986

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	Terrorism Review
	13 January 1986
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	Terrorism Review	
	13 January 1986	
Focus	Overview of State-Supported Terrorism in 1985	
	State support remained a significant factor in terrorism of Middle East or 1985. Armed attacks—principally assassination attempts—and bombings accounted for nearly three-fourths of all incidents. The number of kidnapir than doubled over 1984. We do not believe Syria, Iran, or Libya have chatheir politics or reduced the extent of their support for terrorism, although and Iranian-sponsored groups carried out fewer attacks this year than last sponsored groups—primarily radical Palestinian factions—accounted for substantial increase in terrorist activity. State sponsors will continue to ta interests, but the battleground may shift to Europe as targets in the Midd continue to become less accessible.	ngs more nged Libyan- Syrian- a rget US
	Qadhafi will always target dissident Libyans opposed to him, but recently appears to be expanding his terrorist activity by becoming more closely in with such radical groups as Abu Nidal. This group's activities, while unde sponsorship earlier this year, have accounted for much of the increase in S backed terrorism. Evidence of operational coordination between Libya and Nidal, however, was lacking until the Rome and Vienna El Al attacks. Of fronts, we have evidence that Libyan agents are attempting to gather info about US personnel and facilities in several countries, suggesting that Lib losing its reluctance to directly target US interests.	volved r Syrian Syrian- d Abu n other rmation
	Iranian-sponsored activity could increase if, for example, Iran forsakes the begun last spring to influence the Persian Gulf states by diplomatic means activates the terrorist networks it has continued to develop there. Iranian could also rise if its surrogates seek US or French targets outside the Midd where bombings and kidnapings have for the most part driven away rema Western targets. Islamic Jihad threatened on 31 December that further kidnapings and attacks against the United States would take place in 198 Finally, Syrian-supported activity promises to remain high as long as Dam embroiled in the turbulent Lebanese and Palestinian situations and oppose moderate Arab attempts to move forward on the peace process.	s and activity fle East, ining 6. nascus is
	We continue to watch for evidence that the Middle East state sponsors are operational links to each other. At year's end, however, the only such ties know of consisted of bilateral relationships, like that between Libya and I which they both support Iraqi dissidents. Cooperation is most likely to cor be on a bilateral basis, with Iran and Libya the only two states having alr discussed terrorist cooperation. Last summer, they issued a communique processer ties on a whole range of issues, but we have not yet seen evidence of operational planning for terrorist activity. The relationship between Iran a	that we ran in ntinue to eady pledging f

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relations similarly soured during the summer.

Iran

Iran and Iranian-supported groups remain a major terrorist threat, particularly to US interests, although they were not as active in 1985. In 1984 almost one-fourth of all Middle Eastern attacks were known to involve Iranian or Iranian-supported groups. In the first nine months of 1985, they were responsible for at least 36 attacks. Iraq, France, and the United States remain the principal targets, but the Persian Gulf states face an increasing threat as well. Iranian-sponsored groups active this year include:

- Radical Shia groups in Lebanon, particularly Hizballah, who claim to have killed William Buckley and continue to hold at least four other American hostages. Hizballah also held five of the American hostages during the TWA hijacking last summer, which delayed the resolution of the incident for some time.
- Iraqi dissidents, who this year staged at least two attacks in the hometown of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. We believe Libya and Iran are trying to coordinate the anti-Iraqi activities of these groups.

•	Shia dissidents from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Pro-Iranian dissidents
	attempted to assassinate the Amir of Kuwait last May, and terrorist cells have
	been uncovered in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in the last several
	months.

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Tehran also targets Iranian exiles. Last August, a former security official of the Shah's regime was murdered in Turkey, and in September an exiled Iranian tribal leader with close ties to the Shah was gunned down in Pakistan. Iran also attempts to promote subversive activity among the Shia populations in countries as farflung as Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Syria

Syria continued to sponsor terrorist attacks against moderate Arab and Western interests, although Syrian personnel were not directly involved in any incidents. Syrian-supported groups staged some 30 attacks in the first nine months of 1985, including two against US facilities. Many of these attacks were carried out by the Abu Nidal Group, although there were reports near year's end that Abu Nidal had quarreled with Damascus and moved his operations to Tripoli.

Syrian-backed radical Palestinian groups have been especially active against Jordanian targets since the Palestine National Council meeting in Jordan in November 1984 and the PLO-Jordan accord in February 1985:

- On a single day in March, three Jordanian airline offices were bombed in three different European countries.
- A rocket fired at a Jordanian airliner in April struck the plane, nearly causing a major loss of life.

Syrian-supported groups have attacked US facilities, although we do not know if Syrian officials explicitly approved such attacks. Indeed, the degree of Syrian	
control over these groups varies and is not total. It is unlikely that Assad wants to	
directly target US facilities and personnel, but we believe he would exploit the	
anti-Americanism of these groups to challenge US policies that Syria opposes.	25X1
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Libya	
Virtually all of Libya's terrorist attacks in 1985 were directed against Qadhafi's	
favorite targets—his own exiled countrymen:	
• Exiles have been gunned down in Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy, and	
Austria. Egypt twice this year stopped attempts in Egypt on the life of Libya's	
former Prime Minister.	
• Libya's plans to disrupt the annual pilgrimage to Mecca did not bear fruit this	
year, but Libya almost certainly will plan some activity for the next hajj.	25X1
Tripoli may be turning away from targeting exiles to concentrate on its activities in	
the Sudan and on strengthening its longstanding relationship with radical	
Palestinian groups. Abu Nidal and Libya appear to have cooperated in the El Al	
attacks in Vienna and Rome, and Libya may have had a hand in the Egyptair	
hijacking in November.	25 X 1
Qadhafi's reach extends far beyond Libya's borders:	
• In the Caribbean, Libya has made lavish promises of money and training to	
leftist groups and tried to promote anti-US and anti-French sentiments.	
• In Zaire, local security officials thwarted a bomb plot in September directed	0.5344
against President Mobutu.	25X1
Libya also provides training and funds to dissident groups in Latin America, East	
Asia, and the Pacific, although Qadhafi seems most interested in Latin America—	
outside his traditional circle of North Africa—as his next target of opportunity.	OEV4
outside his traditional effect of North Africa—as his next target of opportunity.	25X1 25X1
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Prospects	
State-supported terrorism is likely to remain a major feature of Middle	
East-origin terrorism in 1986. Increased security and the low-key presence of US	
personnel has made targeting Americans more difficult. Prospects are good,	
therefore, that state sponsors of terrorism will turn increasingly to Western Europe	
in particular to continue attacks against the United States.	25X1
The three state sponsors will also continue their heavy use of surrogates and will	
try to exploit the fragmented Palestinian movement to conduct attacks where the	
state and the Palestinian group have overlapping interests—such as the attacks	
against Jordan or the cooperation between Libya and Abu Nidal in recent	
incidents. This level of tactical and operational coordination is far more likely than	
a "terrorist entente," involving a coordination of strategy among Iran, Libya, and	
Syria.	25X1

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	Highlights	
El Salvador	Key Indicator FPL Planning Attack on US Embassy the Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation	25X1
	Forces is planning to stage an attack on the US Embassy in El Salvador some time after 10 December. The attackers may receive some help from other Colombian and Chilean terrorists. The FPL has demonstrated a continuing interest in the assassination or abduction of US personnel, and, in view of the threat, the Embassy has increased its already tight security.	
	Significant Developments	25 X 6
		25X6

Martin Thiel, one of West Germany's most wanted terrorists, turned himself in to police in Saarland on 2 December. Thiel was thought to have gone underground in late November 1984. An arrest warrant sworn out in April of this year charged him with suspected membership in the RAF. Since his arrest, these charges reportedly have been reduced to continued support for a terrorist organization. Preliminary investigations have led West German authorities to believe Thiel was not involved in the 8 August Rhein-Main Airbase bombing and had not joined the RAF hardcore. In light of this, it is unlikely his arrest will seriously hurt the RAF.

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Spain	Suspected Terrorist's Death May Cause ETA Backlash The discovery on 16 December of the handcuffed body of Mikel Zabalza, a suspected member of the separatist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty-Military Wing (ETA-M), has caused violent protests, a general strike, and some of the largest antigovernment demonstrations in recent history throughout the Basque region. An autopsy determined that his death was due to drowning, but widespread speculation of police involvement and possibly even torture of the suspected terrorist prior to his death continues, particularly in the leftist Basque nationalist press.	25 X 1
	Zabalza was arrested on 26 November, one day after ETA-M claimed responsibility for two machinegun attacks in Guizpuzcoa that resulted in three deaths. the suspected terrorist escaped from three civil guardsmen while en route to show them an ETA-M arms cache in Navarra Province. Angry at the Spanish Government's failure to present a rapid explanation of his disappearance, thousands of Basques staged a demonstration and were dispersed by tear gas and rubber bullets. Several dozen persons, including 23 policemen, were injured and at least 40 arrested.	25X1 25X1
	The Zabalza case, which has momentarily revived support for radical Basque movements, is a setback for the government's recent counterterrorist efforts, which include a renewed amnesty offer for repentant Spanish Basque exiles.	25 X 1
	Spanish Court Sentences GAL Members For the first time since the Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (GAL) appeared in late 1983, a Spanish court has sentenced two of its alleged members to prison terms. On 12 December Daniel Fernandez Acena and Mariano Morelada Munoz were given 30-year prison terms for the murder—believed to be the wrong target—of Frenchman Jean Pierre Leiba in Hendaye in March 1984. A third accused man was acquitted. The conviction of the two GAL operators could alleviate some of the widespread suspicion that exists in the Basque provinces that GAL operations are closely connected with the Spanish security services.	25X1
Portugal	FP-25 May Resume Terrorist Activity FP-25 members still at large may soon resume terrorist activities. The recent arrest of a leading FP-25 operative and the continuing trial of many of the group's political leaders may cause members still at large to renew their efforts in order to attract international attention. The ongoing trial, which is likely to last throughout most of 1986, may give the FP-25 an	25 X 1
	opportunity to seek aid from states that support radical terrorist groups.	25X1 25X1

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El Salvador	A previously unknown group claimed responsibility for three murders in December. The "Protector Army of Santa Ana" announced its vigilante actions against "delinquents" in a communique to local radio stations on 7 December. The bodies of three youths, apparently strangled, were found in the hamlet of Arenera, 80 kilometers west of San Salvador.	25 X 1
Venezuela	Possible Terrorist Resurgence The largely inactive Venezuelan Red Flag terrorist group plans to kidnap US diplomats in Maracaibo and Venezuelan businessmen in the states of Apure, Barinas, and Merida. Barinas, and Merida. The kidnaping plots may be the focus of a new campaign designed to embarrass the Venezuelan Government. The Colombian M-19 group reportedly is working with the Red Flag.	25X1 25X1
	In recent years, the Red Flag has conducted only sporadic low-level terrorist operations near the Colombian border. The group is still reorganizing and probably is not capable of undertaking a sustained terrorist campaign. Nevertheless, its ties to the M-19 may significantly improve its capability to carry out attacks.	25 X 1
Colombia	US Citizens Kidnaped On 10 December approximately 100 armed guerrillas of the leftist People's Liberation Army (EPL) attacked a Bechtel Corporation construction site in northern Colombia and kidnaped two US engineers. Press reports indicate that the guerrillas are demanding \$6 million for the release of John Geddes and Edward Sohl. The kidnapers set a deadline of 20 December.	25 X 1
	The EPL recently renounced its 1984 cease-fire agreement with the government and the kidnapings apparently are an attempt by the group to acquire funds to finance future operations. Kidnaping negotiations with Colombian guerrilla groups often last months and occasionally even years.	25 X 1
Chile		
		25 X 1

	South African Embassy Targeted Two attacks against the South African Embassy in Santiago occurred within days of each other. The first, on the night of 24-25 November, occurred when a bomb placed outside the main entrance gate was defused by security personnel. The second attack involved a car bomb that exploded on 2 December in front of the annex to the South African Embassy. The car belonged to a first secretary of the Embassy.	25X1
Namibia	SWAPO Offensive Expected The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) will commence its rainy season infiltration in late December Subsequent terrorist activity is anticipated. SWAPO is believed to have improved its ambush techniques and possibly to have acquired heavier weapons, such as 122-mm and B-10 rockets. White farming areas in southern Namibia may be targeted. Stepped-up African National Congress attacks in South Africa may cause some thinning of South African forces in Namibia but we believe they will still be able to cope with any increased SWAPO activity.	25X1 25X1
Sri Lanka	Prospects for Increasing Violence Continued cease-fire violations and a wide gap between the proposals of President J. R. Jayewardene and hardline Tamil separatists have eroded prospects for communal peace and raised the likelihood of increased insurgent and terrorist violence in Sri Lanka. Jayewardene has offered several concessions to moderate Tamil representatives, but his actions are unlikely to appease Tamil hardliners who want a separate state. He has already shown some flexibility on proposals for provincial control over land settlement and local police forces, according to diplomatic reporting. These proposals, however, do not offer an independent Tamil state or a linkage of provincial control over the contested Northern and Eastern provinces. Although moderate Tamil groups are willing to hammer out an agreement based on the President's proposals, they fear they will face reprisals from hardliners if they go too far.	25 X 1
	During the cease-fire, separatist factions have continued fighting government security forces. The intransigence of several Tamil groups, coupled with the ineffective cease-fire agreement, have led Jayewardene to believe that further talks—even with Indian mediation—will prove fruitless. If negotiations stall, wider violence probably will erupt in the next several months.	25X1
Japan	Police Bus Attacked With Fire Bombs On 23 November, four or five men attacked a bus carrying approximately 20 riot police officers in Chiba Prefecture. The bus was not damaged, and no injuries were reported. Police believe that radical elements, which target Narita Airport facilities, were responsible. On the same night, timed incendiary devices destroyed two cars in Chiba-ken, Police suspect the cars were used as getaway vehicles by	

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those who attacked the police bus.

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Iranian Support for Terrorism in 1985

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The level of Iranian-supported terrorism in 1985 remained high, although the number of incidents we can specifically link to Iranian-supported groups dropped. Iranian-backed terrorist groups were responsible for at least 36 attacks during the first nine months of 1985. While Iraq, France, and the United States remain the primary targets, Persian Gulf states face an increasing terrorist threat that could escalate sharply if the Iran-Iraq war intensifies. The spillover of Iranian-sponsored terrorism into Western Europe potentially jeopardizes Western interests there.

Over the past nine months, available evidence indicates that pro-Iranian Shia in Lebanon have been responsible for at least 24 incidents of international terrorism including eight attacks against French and five against US targets. Among the more notorious acts:

The Main Targets

Hizballah was responsible for kidnaping three private US citizens this year. Although the Rev. Benjamin Weir was released in September,
Hizballah elements still hold at least four Americans.

Iraq is a primary target of Iranian-sponsored groups. Iran trains and finances several Iraqi dissident groups, such as the Dawa Party, that are dedicated to overthrowing President Saddam Husayn. Although Dawa Party activity inside Iraq has declined since security forces penetrated the group's clandestine network and arrested hundreds of its members in 1983, it recovered in 1985. Dawa Party members conducted two bombings in Saddam's hometown of Tikrit and in October engaged in firefights with Iraqi security forces in two communities near Baghdad. If Iran

 Radical Shia terrorists probably were responsible for the murders of four members of the French observer force in January and February and the kidnaping of three French diplomats in March, two of whom are still being held. Two private French citizens remain missing. Anonymous callers claimed Islamic Jihad was responsible for three of these incidents.

October engaged in firefights with Iraqi security forces in two communities near Baghdad. If Iran suffers further setbacks in its war with Iraq, Tehran may shift from a mostly military strategy to a greater focus on terrorism against Iraqi targets.

• Radical Shias may have kidnaped two British citizens in West Beirut on 14 and 15 March. The two were subsequently released, perhaps when their captors realized they were not Americans.

Lebanon has been the scene of most Iraniansponsored terrorist activity against the United States
and France. The radical Shia groups in Lebanon—
funded, supplied, and trained by Iran—are dedicated
to bringing about an Islamic revolution in Lebanon.
They consider the elimination of all Western,
particularly American, presence in Lebanon to be the
first step toward achieving their goal. Iran also has
encouraged attacks against French targets because of
France's support for Iraq. Although Iran almost
certainly does not know of or condone every Hizballah
attack, the radical Lebanese Shias still receive
significant Iranian support and guidance, and Tehran
maintains a great deal of influence over the Hizballah
movement.

The Persian Gulf

Iran appears prepared to increase terrorist activities throughout the Persian Gulf in retaliation for the Gulf states' support for Iraq. In May, an attempt was made to assassinate the Amir of Kuwait. Shia dissidents from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain continue to receive military training in Iran and then return home to undertake subversive activity. Moreover, recent discoveries of terrorist cells and planned operations against several Gulf states by Iranian-sponsored groups suggest that Tehran is strengthening its terrorist option:

an Iranian-sponsored team of
Lebanese Shia terrorists was planning terrorist
actions directed at Kuwaiti or US interests.

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Secret Although to the best of our knowledge, Iran was not 25X1 involved in planning or staging the TWA hijacking from Greece in June, the hijackers' communiques clearly indicated the influence of Iranian propaganda, and pro-Iranian Hizballah elements in Lebanon subsequently took control of the hijacking. That operation indicated that radical Shias have developed the capability to conduct terrorist attacks in Europe, which makes them a greater threat to US interests there. 25X1 Iran continues to track 25X1 anti-Khomeini exiles in Europe. In August, a former Iranian security official was murdered in Turkey. 25X1 Other assassination attempts could occur at any time—especially in France, with its large Iranian exile population. 25X1 Iran uses its network of diplomatic 25X1 and cultural missions to support these terrorist operations. Many elements of the Iranian Government, including several senior officials, are Plans and training have been reported in recent directly involved in terrorist activity. For example, months concerning the targeting of critical Gulf direct links between Tehran and terrorist activities economic facilities, such as oil facilities and abroad are maintained through the Foreign Ministry 25X1 desalinization plants. and the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard). Iran also 25X1 supports cultural institutions and pro-Khomeini student associations in Western Europe, particularly in Italy, West Germany, Spain, and France. These institutions spread pro-Iranian propaganda among the Should Iraq inflict further substantial damage on sizable expatriate Iranian and Arab student and Khark Island, Iran appears prepared to increase worker populations in Europe and may also be terrorist activities throughout the Persian Gulf in involved in recruiting. retaliation. US personnel and facilities could be 25X1 included in such a campaign. 25X1 Iran also is involved in agitation and propaganda activity among Muslim populations in countries as **Activities Elsewhere** diverse as Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Pro-Iranian terrorists also operate in Western Europe. Philippines. For example, in Pakistan, militant Tehran recently opened an unofficial office in Shias—with direct Iranian support—conducted Barcelona and Spanish security services are violent demonstrations in July 1985 intended to force concerned that the new office could become a center the government to allow Shias to impose Islamic law for terrorist activity. Spanish authorities closed on their own community. In September 1985, an another unofficial Iranian office in July 1984 after exiled Iranian tribal leader with close ties to the Shah obtaining evidence that the Iranians planned to hijack

was gunned down in Karachi.

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a Saudi airliner. The Iranians also were charged at that time with illegal possession of arms and

explosives.

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Export of the revolution is a central tenet of the	
clerical regime in Iran and terrorism has been a	
primary instrument in supporting this objective. So	
long as the character of the current regime remains as	
aggressive and hostile to the West as it is at present,	
Iran's policy of sponsoring terrorism is unlikely to	
change.	25X
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Libyan Support for Terrorism—1985 Libya's terrorist effort this year continued to focus on Libyan Antiexile Campaign traditional targets. The assassination campaign Over half of Libya's attacks this year were against its against anti-Qadhafi exiles remained a top priority own exiled dissidents. Qadhafi maintains a "hit list" and accounted for the majority of attacks. The of exiles and pursues these individuals around the governments and leaders of selected moderate, proworld. Some attacks have been planned for months, Western countries in the Arab world and Africa are while others appear to have been spontaneous and also targets of frequent Libyan plotting, although opportunistic. Libya runs antiexile operations out of Libya has yet to score a successful attack against any several People's Bureaus in Western Europe: Bonn, of these leaders. Libya continues its support for Vienna, and Nicosia were particularly active this insurgents worldwide but has spent relatively more time this year on efforts in Sudan and the Caribbean. be a new locus. Qadhafi generally uses Libyans for Libya provides training, weapons, money, and other attacks on dissidents in Europe, although he tends to forms of support to about 30 different groups overall. employ surrogates or mercenaries for attacks in other locations and against other targets. In almost all antiexile operations, the assassins kill their victims Libya still devotes considerable resources to its with handguns. terrorist and subversive activity, yet the number of successful attacks we can definitely link to Libya in We believe Qadhafi may again step up his pace of 1985 is down—from 25 attacks in 1984 to nine during activity against dissidents, but internal turmoil may the first 11 months of 1985. Libyan concentration on be his highest priority in the near term. Qadhafi is subversive activity in North Africa is probably partly deeply worried about the opposition's ability to topple responsible for the decline, although the ability of his regime and will continue to focus his terrorist European security services to thwart attacks also has resources against it. Libyan intelligence uses networks contributed to the slowdown. Libya may be becoming in place in official and unofficial Libyan installations more active in its longstanding relationship with in Europe and supplements them with "traveling Palestinian radical groups. terrorist consultants" based in Tripoli. European Libyan cooperation with radical Palestinian groups is deepening—possibly including political and economic joint planning for terrorist operations. considerations inhibit many governments from cracking down more effectively: Also of concern is Tripoli's apparent willingness to pursue its exiles within the United States, possibly to • Tripoli's antiexile assassination campaign accounted embarrass the United States with terrorist activity on for a greater percentage of attacks this year than in its own soil. An ambitious plan to kill several Libyan 1984, when Qadhafi reintroduced the tactic after a exiles in the United States was broken up by the FBI three-year respite. Anti-Qadhafi exiles have been last May. Libya also continues low-level activity that killed in Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy, and could lay the groundwork for anti-US attacks in Austria this year. certain areas of the world: several cases of Libyan surveillance of US installations and personnel—which • The Libyan exile community in Egypt has also been could lead to contingency plans for such attacksa frequent target, but Egyptian authorities have have been detected. Serious constraints against such been effective in thwarting attacks. A four-man

Cairo.

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Libyan team was arrested in November during an

attempted attack against a gathering of exiles near

attacks remain, however.

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• Libya also plotted attacks against exiles within the United States. In May, a Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata and 16 nonofficial Libyans were subpoenaed to appear before a US grand jury in connection with a plot to kill Libyan dissidents in four different states.

Plots gainst Moderate Arab Officials

Qadhafi has long targeted moderate Arab governments for their refusal to continue the military struggle against Israel and for their links to the West. The primary targets of such attacks in 1985 were the Governments of Egypt, Tunisia, and Iraq:

- President Mubarak of Egypt remains a principal target. Moreover, Egypt has captured several teams of Libyan-supported Egyptian dissidents who reportedly planned to destabilize the government with sabotage and other disturbances.
- Tunisia also received special attention from Qadhafi. Tripoli expelled more than 30,000 Tunisian workers from Libya in August and infiltrated terrorist agents among them, hoping to further destabilize Tunisia's shaky economy. A team of Libyan terrorists carrying bombs and planning attacks on several facilities was captured, and the Libyan diplomat running the operation out of Sfax was expelled. Soon thereafter, another Libyan diplomat used the diplomatic pouch to smuggle letter bombs addressed to Tunisian journalists into the country. After two postal workers were injured when several of these bombs exploded, Tunisia severed relations.

Support for African Insurgents and Terrorists

Qadhafi usually prefers to ensure plausible denial in acts of terrorism that Libya sponsors. The use of surrogates is one way in which he distances Libya from such attacks. Many of the surrogates belong to dissident groups whom Libya trains, funds, and arms. Libya is particularly active in supporting these groups in Sub-Saharan Africa:

 Tripoli has conducted extensive subversive activity in Sudan since a coup in April ousted longtime Qadhafi enemy President Nimeiri. No terrorist incidents have occurred to date, despite the plethora of threat rumors. Qadhafi has a network in place, however, that he could quickly activate. We believe Tripoli has held back from terrorism because diplomatic channels have proved so fruitful until recently. A terrorist event cannot be ruled out, however, especially if Libyan-Sudanese relations deteriorate or if a domestic political crisis arises that is too opportune to ignore.

Autor and a second and a second

- Libya continues to fund, train, and arm Zairian dissidents in large numbers and send them home on terrorist and subversive missions. Zairian officials claimed in September to have thwarted at least one Libyan-sponsored plot against President Mobutu. The President's effective personal security and the ineptitude of the dissidents have so far stymied all assassination attempts.
- In February, Chad complained to the United Nations that Libya had attempted to assassinate President Habre in September 1984. Photographs of the Libyan-made attache case bomb that was to be used in the attack were provided as evidence.

Activities in Latin America and Asia

Qadhafi appears increasingly intent on extending his revolution to areas far removed from Libya. He has used Islamic Call Societies and funding for numerous dissident groups in Asia and Latin America to extend his reach.

In the Caribbean, Libya hopes to gather intelligence, gain political influence, and undermine US and French interests. Tripoli's method of operation has been to offer dissidents training and trips to Libya and to promise them money on the condition that they perform acts of violence. Libya has met with virtually no success in the Caribbean to date, and we do not expect any dramatic increase in terrorist activity there in the near term. The more militant French-speaking separatists may be more willing to undertake terrorist activity, but English-speaking leftists are likely to

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continue to reject violence. Cuba is reportedly concerned about the increasing Libyan role in the Caribbean and has warned several groups away from Libyan support:

- People's Bureaus in Caracas and Panama probably coordinate activity in the region. Libya reportedly would like to use unofficial facilities such as the Islamic Call Society in Curacao and a regional newspaper office in Barbados as cover organizations for subversive activity.
- Libya is providing money and some training and arms to dissidents in the Caribbean. Libya seems to be having the greatest success with groups in Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guiana.

dissidents in several countries receive aid from Tripoli:

Libya has promised financial support to the Movement for the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Chile in return for a more visible guerrilla effort. A recent report

indicates \$100,000 has been received by the MIR.

Latin America has also felt the Libyan hand.

a high-ranking member of the M-19 in Colombia recently stated that Libya is the group's main source of arms, training, and money. We doubt, however, that Libya has replaced Cuba as the M-19's main supporter.

Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras has received money from Libya.

The Libyan effort in Asia and the Pacific is less substantial but growing. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, serves as a local coordinating center, and Islamic Call Societies are also centers of activity. Most Libyan activity is subversive—the provision of funds and

training to dissidents—but Tripoli occasionally offers support for specific events:

- Tripoli reportedly provided funds to opposition groups in Vanuatu and New Caledonia. The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines received unspecified support following Nur Misuari's meeting with Qadhafi in July.
- In June, Bangladeshi police arrested a Libyantrained Bangladeshi national for plotting to kill President Ershad. This individual had received Libyan support in an earlier coup attempt.

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Links to Palestinians

Originally a strong supporter of Yasir Arafat,
Qadhafi shifted his support for the Palestinian cause
to more radical groups in the early 1970s, when he
felt Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization were becoming too moderate. This trend
accelerated after Abu Musa's faction broke with
Arafat in 1982. Libya since has supported such
groups as the PNSF, PFLP, PFLP-GC, and Abu
Nidal. offering arms. money, training, and refuge.

the relationship with Abu

Nidal has broadened to include joint operational coordination:

• Libya provided three passports used by the Abu Nidal terrorists in the attack on the El Al counter in Vienna on 27 December. Two of the passports were seized by Libya when it expelled 30,000 Tunisian workers last August. This is the first concrete evidence of Libyan operational support to Abu Nidal.

• Libyan Charge there wrote and secretly distributed statements on behalf of the hijackers of the Egyptair jet in November—an incident claimed by a group using an Abu Nidal covername.

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Libya also has been active with other radical	Attacks against US targets in the United States are	
Palestinian elements this year:	unlikely, but Libya would like to embarrass the	
	United States with terrorism on its own soil by	
• A coalition of radical Palestinians formed the	targeting anti-Qadhafi dissidents here. Tripoli is also	
Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF) in	forgoing ties to US radical groups. A Libyan attack	
Damascus amid much publicity last February.	against the United States elsewhere in the world	
Libya provides	cannot be ruled out, and some analysts judge that	25X1
almost all of the PNSF's funds.	Qadhafi now is especially likely to seek opportunities	,
	to attack the United States in an effort to exploit the	
• Libya may have	growing anti-US sentiment in the Arab states.	25X1
plotted to kill a high-level Fatah official in Berlin in	Qadhafi probably believes anti-US attacks would	20/(1
August.	keep him in the forefront of the worldwide	25X1
	revolutionary struggle. Should he elect to take the	25X1
	risks associated with an anti-US attack, he probably	20/1
Threat to the United States	will work through surrogates to disguise the Libyan	
Qadhafi fears retaliation for attacks against US	hand.	0EV1
targets and has never attacked an American official	nanu.	25 X 1
or facility. There clearly are circumstances, however,		25X1
		23/(1
in which he is willing to take the risk. We believe		
Libya is preparing contingency plans to attack US		
targets, and attribute the failure of Libya to attempt		
attacks against the United States in the past to lack of		
pre-operational planning, poor security, and the		0.51/4
general incompetence of Libyan agents.		25X1
Libyan agents		25 X 1
may be gathering intelligence on US personnel and		

facilities in Tunisia, Sudan, Somalia, Greece, Italy,

and Saudi Arabia.

Syrian Support for Terrorism—1985		25 X 1
Syria continued to be a major patron of international terrorism throughout 1985. While we identified no attacks involving Syrian personnel directly, the incidence of attacks carried out by groups operating with Syrian support increased compared with the same period in 1984. So far this year, these groups have been involved in at least 23 terrorist attacks against moderate Arab—especially Jordanian—US, British, Palestinian, or Israeli targets. Groups receiving Syrian support have attacked US facilities twice this year. Why Terrorism? President Assad uses terrorist tactics to dissuade opponents and recalcitrant allies from pursuing policies inimical to Syrian interests. Support for terrorist groups costs Syria little but raises the cost to participants of any peace initiative that excludes	attacks, and a desire to obtain leverage over those groups he supports. Damascus offers a wide range of support to terrorist groups—from the use of Syrian or Syrian-controlled territory for base camps, training facilities, and political headquarters to arms, travel assistance, intelligence, and probably money. Palestinians who are largely funded, trained, and armed by Syria include the militant Abu Nidal Group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command, Abu Musa's Fatah rebels, and Saiqa. By far the most active Syrian-supported group in 1985 was the militant Abu Nidal Group, which was probably responsible for two-thirds of the attacks, including: • A handgrenade attack by an unidentified man on the Jordanian Airline office in Rome in March that injured three people. Black September—an Abu	25X1
Damascus and serves to keep Assad's regional rivals off balance as well. Syria has instigated terrorist operations against Jordanian officials and facilities and pro-Arafat PLO officials in reaction to efforts to build moderate Arab support for peace negotiations with Israel and to PLO Chairman Arafat's rapprochement with King Hussein. In the wake of the Palestine National Conference in Amman in November 1984 and the PLO-Jordan accord of February 1985, the number of attacks on Jordanian targets by Syrian-supported groups this year has nearly doubled over that of 1984. Increasing strains in Syria's relations with Iraq, the Gulf states, Turkey, and others are prompting similar terrorist responses. Syrian Use of Surrogates	 Nidal covername—claimed responsibility. A grenade attack on a Rome sidewalk cafe in September injured 38 tourists, including nine Americans. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems (ROSM)—another Abu Nidal covername—claimed responsibility for the attack. Nine days after the attack on the cafe, police arrested a Palestinian in connection with an explosion at the British Airways office in Rome that injured 15. The suspect claimed to be a member of ROSM and was later identified by witnesses as the same man who attacked the Jordanian Airline office in Athens in March. The degree of control exercised by Syria over its surrogates varies. The Abu Nidal Group appears to 	25X1 25X1 25X1
Damascus's increasing use of surrogates reflects a continued easing of the internal threat to the Syrian regime, Assad's desire to mask Syria's role in terrorist	maintain a fairly high degree of operational independence, while Saiqa is for all intents and purposes an arm of the Syrian state. Damascus also supports non-Palestinian groups, including the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, Iraqi dissidents,	25X1

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and the Jordanian People's Revolutionary Party (JPRP) which attacked US targets twice in early th 1985: • A bomb defused near a USAID employee's home in Jordan was later discovered to be of JPRP origin. • An explosive device defused at the American Center for Oriental Studies in Amman was determined to be the work of the JPRP. A key non-Palestinian group that received Syrian support in 1985 was the radical Lebanese Shia Hizballah. Shortly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, several hundred Iranian revolutionary guards were permitted to set up training and staging bases for Hizballah in the Syrianoccupied Bekaa Valley Since the withdrawal of the MNF in May 1984, however, Syria has been working to stabilize the security situation throughout Lebanon and is currently pursuing a dual-track policy of imposing some constraints on Hizballah, while at the same time attempting to co-opt them into operations more in line with Syrian interests.

Cooperation With Other State Supporters

Syria cooperates selectively with the other two major Middle Eastern sponsors of terrorism, Libya and Iran. The three states share a desire to undermine US policies in the Middle East, to "liberate" territory occupied by Israel, and to weaken pro-Western moderate Arab governments; however, available evidence does not indicate that they are pursuing a coordinated terrorist strategy. Divergent interests and longstanding rivalries among the three make temporary bilateral tactical ties on a case-by-case basis the norm.

Relations among Libya, Iran, and Syria recently have fallen to a low point despite their continuing interest in a radical axis. Qadhafi remains excluded by Syria and Iran from the role he wants in Lebanon. Tehran has become increasingly concerned about Syrian dominance in Lebanon. Syria is least dependent on the good will of the other two radical states and less committed to unity with its radical partners and has,

therefore, suffered least from frictions among the	
three.	25X1

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The USSR has never been clearly linked to a specific Syrian-backed operation, but Moscow and Damascus have a common interest in blocking the Hussein-Arafat peace intiative. To the extent that support and training of specific radical groups advance that goal, Moscow and Damascus cooperate, although policy differences limit such cooperation. Moscow does not want Syria to gain control of the Palestinian movement and opposes Syrian terrorist acts directed at pro-Arafat Palestinians. Moscow's position could change if significant progress is made toward joint Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli talks.

Attacks on US Targets

Syrian support for its surrogate groups in Jordan and Lebanon and for Shia groups in Lebanon has made Damascus a party to bombings of US facilities, but we do not know if Syrian officials explicitly approved the targets. We do not believe that Assad is intent on directly targeting US personnel and facilities, but we believe that he would take advantage of the anti-American militancy of the groups he supports to encourage attacks against the United States if that serves Syrian interests. In this way, Assad will continue to try to impose high costs on the United States for policies he opposes and at the same time use the leverage he gains over groups that get Syrian support to persuade US policymakers that Damascus must be bargained with and Syrian interests must receive high consideration in Washington.

Outlook

Assad probably will continue to encourage the selective use of terrorism to the extent that he believes it will advance his political fortunes. The use of surrogate groups has advantages that, for the most part, will make it both undesirable and unnecessary for him to use Syrian agents. King Hussein and Arafat will continue to be the most obvious and accessible targets for Syrian-supported groups. Assad probably also will continue to take advantage of the anti-American militancy of groups he supports, even though he probably will not actively direct operations against US targets.

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Iraq's Involvement in International Terrorism—1985		25X1
Iraq continued to limit its involvement in international terrorism in 1985. Iraqi-sponsored terrorist activity this year has been targeted almost exclusively against Syria and Libya in an effort to	The Syrians believe he was responsible for at least four attacks inside Syria.	25X1 25X1
increase the cost to these states of their support of Iran, dissident Iraqi Shias, and Kurdish rebels. Iraq has supported pro-Arafat Palestinian attacks against Syria and provided assistance to Libyan dissidents. In recent weeks, there	• Iraqi and PLO officials last summer discussed joint efforts to mount operations against Syrian and Libyan Embassies and other facilities abroad,	25X1 25X1 25X1
have been glimmers of a possible reconciliation between Baghdad and the two radical Arab states. We believe, however, that Iraq remains pessimistic about the chances for a rapprochement in the near future and will continue to encourage surrogate groups to target Syrian and Libyan interests.	• Central Security apparatus has opened three offices in Baghdad and the leader of the apparatus is planning attacks against Syria in coordination with Iraqi officials. The operations reportedly will be staged from Iraq.	25X1 25X1
Baghdad may also support attacks by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) against Israel in the coming months. Iraq has increased significantly its support of Yasir Arafat this year as a counterbalance to growing Syrian dominance of the Palestinian movement. In recent weeks, Baghdad has allowed several hundred additional PLO fighters to move to	• According to Libyan and Iraqi press reports, Baghdad has increased its support of Libyan dissidents since Baghdad broke relations with Tripoli last June. Baghdad also allows Libyan dissidents to broadcast anti-Qadhafi radio programs from Iraq.	25X1
Iraq, but probably is not eager to host PLO political or military headquarters. We believe Arafat will continue to sanction operations inside Israel and the West Bank; Baghdad may be drawn into providing at least indirect support for these attacks. In an effort to protect its relations with the United States, however, we believe Iraq will limit its involvement in PLO operations against Israel and probably will not countenance any attacks outside Israeli territory. Moreover, Baghdad almost certainly will continue to withhold support from radical, non-PLO Palestinian	Other Iraqi-backed terrorist activity this year has included: • Two Iraqis were assassinated in Kuwait and Sweden last March. Iraqi intelligence agents probably conducted these attacks, but the motives for the assassinations are unclear. Both victims probably were associated with Iraqi intelligence, so they may have been killed as part of an intraservice purge, rather than for political reasons.	
Recent Activity In 1985 Iraqi-backed terrorism focused almost	• In August, four Iraqi nationals were arrested in the United Kingdom for attempting to bomb a consignment of war materiel that reportedly was destined for Iran, according to	25X1 25X1
exclusively on Syrian and Libyan targets:	• In late October, despite protests from the United States, Iraq granted asylum to Palestine Liberation Front leader Muhammad al-Zaydan (Abu Abbas), reportedly the mastermind of the Achille Lauro	25X1

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nijacking. Iraq has refused to respond positively to	October and a Libyan delegation in November.	
US requests to extradite Abu Abbas to the United	Nonetheless, in our judgment, Baghdad remains	
States.	pessimistic about the chances for rapprochement with	25 X ′
	Damascus and Tripoli in the near term and will	
Efforts To Stymie Radical Palestinian Groups	continue to encourage surrogate groups—Libyan	
In the face of continued pressure from the United	dissidents, the PLO, and possibly the Muslim	
States and moderate Arab states, Baghdad continued	Brotherhood—to conduct attacks against Syrian and	
its efforts this year to prevent radical, non-PLO	Libyan targets.	2EV1
	Libyan taigets.	25 X 1
Palestinian terrorist groups from operating out of	I was a second as a selection of the second DLO at a 1	
Iraq:	Iraq may also reluctantly support PLO attacks	
	against Israel in the near future. The Iraqis strongly	
• Iraq withheld support from the 15 May	oppose Israel, but recognize that their support of	
Organization and inhibited the group's operations.	terrorism against Israel will damage their relations	
Two terrorists carrying explosive-laden suitcases,	with the United States, whose technology and whose	
however, were arrested in Rome in October after	support for an arms embargo against Iran Baghdad	
arriving from Baghdad. The two claimed they	greatly values. Nonetheless, Baghdad believes	
intended to attack US targets in Italy. While many	increased support of pro-Arafat Palestinian factions is	
details of this incident remain unclear, we believe	necessary in order to counter Syria's efforts to	
the terrorists were members of 15 May. We do not	dominate the Palestinian movement. We believe PLO	
believe, however, that the Iraqi leadership was	terrorists will continue to mount operations against	
aware of the operation. It is possible that Iraqi	Israeli targets, and Iraq may be drawn into providing	
security officials facilitated the operation—without	at least indirect support for these attacks in order to	
the approval of their superiors—by allowing the	bolster Arafat.	25 X 1
terrorists to take the explosives aboard the aircraft.		
	Some 2,000 PLO fighters are now living and training	
•	in Iraq, and, according to the US Embassy in	25 X 1
	Baghdad, Arafat has been transferring additional	
	units to Iraq from North Yemen, Sudan, and Tunisia.	
	In addition, the US Embassy in Amman reported	
	that, in mid-October, the Jordanian Government	
	asked some 35 members of Fatah's Western Sector	
	apparatus to leave Jordan; these operatives reportedly	
	planned to move to Baghdad. The Western Sector has	25X1
	been responsible for planning and executing the bulk	23/1
	of Fatah's attacks in Israel and the occupied	
	territories. Finally,	
		25 X 1
	Arafat has told the leaders of Kuwait and North	
	Yemen that he plans to move PLO headquarters to	
	Baghdad from Tunisia, although Iraqi officials told	
Future Trends	US diplomats in late October that the PLO had not	
In our judgment, Iraq will continue to utilize	yet made such a request.	25X1
terrorism primarily to undermine and isolate its Arab		20/(1
enemies—Syria and Libya. Baghdad is eager to end	Fatah operatives almost certainly will try to plan and	
Syrian and Libyan military support for Tehran and	stage attacks in Israel and the occupied territories	
for Kurdish and Shia dissidents in Iraq. To this end,	from Iraq. Baghdad, however, will try to prevent the	
Iraq will pursue any reasonable opportunities for	PLO from using Iraqi territory as a staging area for	
reconciliation with the radical Arab states, according	such operations in order to limit the damage to its	
to the US Embassy in Baghdad. Press reports indicate		

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Iraqi officials met with a Syrian delegation last

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relations with the United States and reduce the risk of an Israeli retaliatory attack. Baghdad is also likely to discourage PLO attacks conducted against Israeli targets outside Israeli territory. The Iraqis are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, and Baghdad probably will directly support such operations only if the position of Arafat's moderate faction would otherwise erode. Moreover, Iraq will continue to withhold support from radical non-PLO groups like the 15 May Organization and the PFLP-SC.

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	The Terrorism Diary for February 1986
	Below is a compendium of February dates of known or conceivable significance to terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist event.
1 February 1979	Iran. Return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran from exile in Paris.
1 February 1984	India. Kashmir separatist leader Maqbool Butt executed.
1 February 1985	India. Kashmir Liberation Front sets off two bombs to commemorate execution of Maqbool Butt.
4 February 1961	Angola. Beginning of armed struggle against Portugal.
4 February 1948	Sri Lanka. National Day.
5 February 1958	Colombia. Founding of National Liberation Army (ELN).
5 February 1960	Burma. Kachin Independence Army (KIA) Revolution Day.
6 February 1840	New Zealand. Waitangi Day (national day).
6 February 1981	Pakistan. Founding of Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD).
6 February 1984	Lebanon. Fall of West Beirut to Muslim militias.
7 February 1974	Grenada. Independence Day.
7 February 1986	Philippines. Presidential election scheduled.
10 February 1986	Chinese world. Lunar New Year (beginning of Chinese year 4684).
11 February 1929	Italy, Vatican. Lateran Treaty signed (governs relationship between Italy and Vatican City).
11 February 1979	Iran. Revolution Day; "Eleventh Dawn" (the 11th day of the revolution is considered the day of victory over the old regime).
11 February	Japan. National Foundation Day.
12 February 1947	Burma. Union Day.
13 February 1961	Zaire. Death of Patrice Lumumba.
13 February 1975	Cyprus. Declaration establishing Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

15 February 1966	Colombia. Death of National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla leader and priest Camilo Torres.
16 February 1918	Lithuania. Independence Day.
17 February 1979	Vietnam. Invasion by Chinese troops.
18 February 1965	The Gambia. Independence Day.
19 February 1947	Poland. People's republic established.
19 February 1952	Nepal. King Tribhuan Memorial Day.
19 February 1980	Egypt, Israel. Exchange of ambassadors.
22 February 1948	Romania. Founding of Romanian Workers' Party.
22 February 1972	Qatar. Coup d'etat that brought Shaikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani to power.
22 February 1979	St. Lucia. Independence Day.
23 February 1970	Guyana. Republic Day.
23 February 1984	Brunei. National Day.
24 February 1948	Czechoslovakia. First Communist government formed.
24 February 1966	Ghana. Liberation Day (overthrow of Nkrumah).
25 February 1948	Kuwait. Independence Day.
25 February 1980	Suriname. Day of Liberation and Renewal.
27 February 1844	Dominican Republic. Independence Day.
27 February 1976	Western Sahara. Founding of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (Polisario government-in-exile).
27 February 1984	Armenians. Terrorist Gouger Migirdic Yanikian of Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) dies of old age in California.
28 February 1977	El Salvador. Leftists demonstrating against alleged election fraud in San Salvador killed by security forces; Popular League of 28 February (LP-28) takes its name from this event.

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Chronology of Terrorism—1985

	Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.	25X1
16 October	Philippines: New People's Army guerrillas set fire to passenger bus at Tagnanan Plantation. About 50 NPA attackers forced the bus into a rural area and had passengers disembark, took the fare collection from the driver, and set fire to the bus.	25X1
30 October	Philippines: Five young farmers executed in separate incidents by New People's Army members. The victims reportedly were killed because they refused to join the NPA.	25 X 1
1 November	South Africa: Explosion injures one man in Johannesburg central office district. The blast came as security forces were carrying out a combined "crime prevention operation." Japan: New Tokyo International Airport hit by rocket attack. Police found four projectiles, three of which had not gone off, in two abandoned buildings; no damage or injuries resulted. The leftist terrorist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction) is suspected.	25X1 25X1
4 November	South Africa: Arms cache discovered by police in Port Elizabeth. Forty-three men, allegedly United Democratic Front supporters, were arrested. Among the weapons found were pistols, spears, axes, gasoline bombs, and various homemade knives.	25X1
9 November	Angola: UNITA claims 15 Soviet nationals killed by bomb in Huambo. The target was a Soviet residence. There were no further details available on the incident, which has not been confirmed.	25 X 1
12 November	Angola: Boobytrapped car blows up in suburban Huambo. The Agriculture Ministry Building was damaged, but no casualties were reported.	25 X 1
20 November	Japan: Explosion reveals four sets of launching devices near New Tokyo International Airport watchtower. No damage or injuries were reported. The leftist group Senki-ha (Battle Flag Faction) claimed credit for the incident.	25X1

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21 November	United Kingdom: Sikhs critically wound president of Indian Overseas Congress in Luton. Police have detained two Sikhs for questioning.	25 X 1
	Mozambique: National Resistance Movement attacks residential area near Andissene. The attackers reportedly killed approximately 50 civilians and wounded several others.	25 X 1
	Japan: Chiba irrigation control station bombed. The leftist group Senki-ha (Battle Flag Faction) claimed responsibility. The facility manages and maintains the Narita Hokuso irrigation system, part of the Narita Airport complex that has long	,
	been the target of terrorist attacks.	25 X 1
	Japan: Fires set at residences of three officials of Japan National Railways in Chiba Prefecture. No injuries were reported. The leftist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction), which had previously firebombed the homes of Narita Airport officials, is believed responsible.	25 X 1
26 November	Philippines: Five civilians killed, seven wounded in Zamboanga del Sur. Authorities believe the attacks may have resulted from the victims' refusal to cooperate with either the New People's Army or the Moro National Liberation	
	Front, both of which are active in the area.	25 X 1
	Philippines: New People's Army members kill two fishermen in Abucay, Bataan. The victims were known for their vocal opposition to the NPA.	25X1
29 November	Spain: ETA ambushes two civil guard vehicles in convoy between Vitoria and Bilbao. No injuries were reported.	25 X 1
	Colombia: People's Liberation Army in Bogota renounces peace truce with government. Members of the group occupied offices of a local news agency and stated they would end the current peace talks because of the 20 November assassination of their leader, Oscar William Calvo.	25X1
1 December	Corsica: Two bombs explode in offices of state-owned electric company in Ajaccio. Leaflets found at the scene were signed by the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica. The bombing was an apparent protest against plans for a power cable	
	linking Corsica and Italy.	25 X 1
2 December	Sri Lanka: Bomb explodes near Batticaloa police station. A young girl was injured in the blast.	25X1
	India: Pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party worker killed and robbed in Punjab. The victim was attacked after he had withdrawn 5,000 rupees (about US \$416) from a bank in Ludhiana District. Sikh separatists are suspected.	25 X 1
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3 December	Peru: Sendero Luminoso marks 51st birthday of its founder and leader, Abimael Guzman, with barrage of dynamite attacks in Lima. Targets included the house of the late Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, founder of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance Party; as well as 10 banks, a shopping center, eight electrical towers, a judicial office, and various other sites—20 to 30 in all. No injuries were reported.	25X1
	Chile: Bomb attacks shake Santiago, killing one and injuring nine. The Manuel Rodriguez Front is believed responsible for the attacks against rail lines, government buildings, and city buses.	25 X 1
	Sri Lanka: Civilian abducted and killed by Tamil guerrillas. The victim reportedly had been reluctant to support the Eelam separatist movement.	25X1
4 December	Belgium: Briefcase containing bomb explodes at offices of the Bank of America in Antwerp. The Communist Combatant Cells claimed responsibility in leaflets delivered to the bank receptionist prior to the explosion.	25 X 1
	Togo: Explosions in Lome kill one, injure two. Bombings occurred near the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Surete Nationale and along railroad tracks. An unexploded bomb, with French-language markings, was found near the site of the first bombing, but government authorities suspect Ghanaian and possibly Libyan involvement.	25X1
5 December	West Germany: Radio and electronics equipment valued at \$40,000 stolen from US Army facility at Mannheim-Seckenheim. The theft is of concern because the equipment would facilitate monitoring US military police communications.	¬ 05¥4
	Authorities have not ruled out the possible involvement of a terrorist group.	25X1
	Philippines: Acting Abra Province vice governor assassinated. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack.	25 X 1
6 December	Belgium: CCC bombs NATO Central European pipeline valve station in Petegram-Wortegem. The Communist Combatant Cells claimed credit for the attack in a telephone call to police and then later in a communique found in	05)//
	Brussels. No one was injured and damage was minimal.	25 X 1
	Belgium: Bombing of Justice Palace in Liege kills one law student and wounds four others. No group has claimed responsibility.	25 X 1
	France: Bomb explodes in building belonging to the Central Europe Operating Agency in Versailles. The agency manages the network of NATO pipelines in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. A French group of "Communist Internationalists" claimed responsibility for the attack.	25X1

	West Germany: Red Army Faction periphery member sentenced for January 1985 bombing. Claudia Wannersdorfer was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for her part in the bomb attack against the Zueblin construction company's computer building in Vaihingen. Her companion was killed when the bomb, concealed in a baby buggy, detonated prematurely.	25X1
	Greece: Arson attack on mayor's official car in Athens claimed by the "Wild	
	Geese of the Cities." The organization claimed that this attack was conducted to	·
	protest the formation of a municipal police force.	25X1
	Colombia: Downtown Bogota attack against Army bus leaves two dead, 11 wounded. The attack occurred exactly one month after members of the 19th of April Movement (M-19) seized the Palace of Justice. The "guerrilla coordination," which consists of the M-19, the National Liberation Army, and other smaller	·
	groups, claimed credit, saying that the attack was in response to the assassination of People's Liberation Army leader Oscar William Calvo.	25X1
	Philippines: New People's Army guerrillas kidnap 14 public works and highways officials in Gingoog City. The hostages reportedly were taken to a rebel hideout in Claveria; one of them is said to have been killed. The mayor has received a	
	100,000-peso ransom demand.	25 X 1
7 December	France: Ministry of Justice office in Marseilles target of bombing attack. The Corsican FLNC claimed responsibility in leaflets found at the scene	25 X 1
	France: Bombs explode at two Paris department stores. One explosion at Galeries Lafayette injured 37 persons; another at Printemps injured five. Claims of responsibility were made by the Palestine Liberation Front, the Armenian Secret	
	Army for Liberation of Armenia, and the Islamic Jihad Organization.	25 X 1
	Iran: Car bomb explodes in front of Shohada Hospital in northern Tehran. The blast killed two and injured 18.	25X1
	Colombia: Bomb explosion at Communist Party headquarters in Bogota seriously injures one. An anonymous caller claimed responsibility for the attack in the name of the People's Liberation Army.	25X1
8 December	Iran: Bomb explodes in Tehran near offices of Islamic Republic News Agency.	
	One person was slightly injured.	25 X 1
	South Africa: African National Congress suspected in unsuccessful attack on Kwazulu official in Durban. The attacker fired shots at the house with a semiautomatic rifle. Police later found cartridges from an AK-type rifle and an	
	unexploded handgrenade.	25 X 1

	South Africa: Bomb blast damages Durban post office. The explosion, caused by a limpet mine, injured eight people and caused extensive damage to the building. Although there has been no claim of responsibility, the African National Congress is suspected.	25X1
10 December	Lebanon: Beirut kidnapers free two Lebanese professors at American University. The motive for the three-day-long kidnaping appears to have been for revenge rather than for political purposes. Their release—which took place at the home of Hizballah "spiritual leader" and terrorist chieftain Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah—probably resulted from pressure by American University personnel, who threatened to go on strike if the two were not released.	25X1
	Pakistan: Four members of Afghan resistance killed, seven wounded in bomb explosion in Peshawar. It is not known whether Afghan intelligence personnel, suspected in similar bombings, were responsible.	25 X 1
	Philippines: Homemade bomb injures five at antigovernment rally at Malcolm Square in Baguio City. The rally was being held to celebrate the 37th anniversary of UN Human Rights Day.	25X1
11 December	Italy: Two homemade bombs explode in church in Assisi. No group has claimed responsibility.	25 X 1
12 December	South Africa: Handgrenade explodes in parking lot of Cape Town meat distributing firm. No one was injured in the blast.	25X1
	Sri Lanka: Bomb explodes on train at railway yard in Maradana. A train from Jaffna had just dropped its passengers at the Colombo Fort Railway Station when the bomb went off. No one was injured and no one has claimed responsibility for the incident.	25X1
13 December	West Germany: Fire bombs at Zueblin construction firm in Zuffenhausen cause estimated US \$100,000 damage. No group has claimed responsibility, but police believe the Red Army Faction may be responsible.	25 X 1
	Namibia: Letter bomb injures two African National Congress members and Zambian in Lusaka. The bomb was believed to have been mailed from Botswana or Zambia and went off as the victim opened it. ANC officials have charged that the South African Government was responsible.	25 X 1
14 December	India: Transistor radio bomb kills boy in Durgapur. It was the first transistor bomb explosion in West Bengal. Similar attacks by Sikh militants have occurred in Punjab, New Delhi, and surrounding states.	25 X 1

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16 December	Spain: Terre Lliure claims responsibility for attempted bombing near Barcelona police station. Police disarmed the device after receiving a tip. In a second incident, a Terre Lliure terrorist was killed when a bomb exploded prematurely.	25 X 1
	India: Unidentified gunmen kill General Secretary of district youth congress in Punjab's Ludhiana District. No arrests have been made, but Sikh separatists are suspected.	25X1
	Philippines: Convoy of logging firm workers ambushed by the Moro National Liberation Front. Sixteen workers were reported killed and another 35 were wounded. It was the first major attack by the MNLF since it vowed to revive its separatist campaign.	, 25X1
17 December	Cyprus: Police arrest two heavily armed Palestinians believed to be planning hijacking of Swiss plane in Larnaca. Sami Anis Maroun Nasser, who carried a Jordanian passport, was arrested trying to board the plane in Larnaca with pistols and grenades concealed in wine bottles. Yezio Gasper Sayiagh, a US passport holder, was arrested the following day in his apartment in Limassol with additional weapons and wine bottles. The individuals' group affiliation is not yet known.	25X1
	Malta: Bomb damages Libyan cultural center. The attack on the Libyan facility in Valletta occurred across the street from the Presidential Palace. Since the bomb was placed inside the building—where it did little damage—the attack probably was not directed against the Maltese Government. No group has claimed responsibility, although anti-Qadhafi Libyan exiles or Palestinians are likely perpetrators.	25 X 1

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